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DAVID CRAIG CARLSEN,
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]

PETITION FOR REHEARING

The Defendant/Appellant, David Craig Carlsen, pursuant to
the provisions of Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and hereby respectfully submits this Petition for
Rehearing.
The granting of this petition seems compelling in light
of the following points and issues:
Point 1.

The Court overlooked or misapprehended that the

Circuit Court's jurisdiction in this case was derivative and
the Defendant could not be prosecuted and convicted for a
different offense in the Circuit Court than as the Defendant
was charged by Information in the Logan City Municipal Justice
Court.
Point 2.

The Court overlooked or misapprehended that the

Defendant has been effectively deprived of any and all rights
to appeal his conviction as guaranteed under Article I, § 12
and Article VIII, § 5 of the Utah Constitution and the Equal

-1-

Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.
Point 3.

The Court overlooked or misapprehended that

the Defendants challenge to the trial court's violation of
the separation of power provisions constituted a challenge
to the Court's subject matter jurisdiction which could be
raised for the first time on appeal.
DISCUSSION OF POINT 1.
Point 1. The Court overlooked or misapprehended that the
Circuit Court's jurisdiction in this case iras derivative and
the Defendant could not be prosecuted and convicted for a
different offense in the Circuit Court than as the Defendant
was charged by Information in the Logan City Municipal
Justice Court.
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Mansfield/ 576 P.2d
1276, 1277 (Utah 1978) observed:
While the matter is not raised by either party on this
appeal, there are two reasons why the dismissal must
stand. In the first place, a complaint on appeal from
a city court cannot be amended in the district court.
The district court has only derivative jurisdiction and,
therefore, if the complaint was faulty in the city court,
it remains faulty on appeal.
Though, the Information was not formally amended by the
Circuit Court on appeal in this case.

The offense of which

the Defendant was prosecuted and convicted in the Circuit Court
was different than as charged by Information in the Logan City
Municipal Justice Court.
The Defendant was charged by Information in the Logan City
Municipal Justice Court with the offense of Following another

-2-

Vehicle Too Closely on November 7, 1992 in violation of Utah
Code Ann, § 41-6-62 as follows:
The acts of the Defendant constituting the public
offense(s) were: That the said Defendant, being the
driver of a motor vehicle, did then and there on the
streets of Logan City, follow another vehicle more
closely than was reasonable and prudent have due regard
for the speed of such vehicle and the traffic upon the
conditions of the street.
Instruction No. 12 given by the Circuit Court to the jury
in this case states:
Before you may convict the Defendant of following too
close, you must find from the evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt, all of the following elements of that crime, to-wit:
1. That the Defendant was driving a motor vehicle at the
time and place as alleged in the Information.
2. That the Defendant was driving in Logan City, Cache
County, State of Utah.
3. That the distance maintained by the defendant between
vehicles was not reasonable and prudent.
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and all
of the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable
doubt, it is your duty to find the defendant guilty of this
offense. On the other hand, if the evidence has failed to
so establish one or more of the said elements, then you
should find the defendant not guilty of this offense.
The offense was amended and altered in the instant case
when the trial court eliminated the requirement of the State
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant followed
another vehicle more closely that was reasonable and prudent
"having due regard for the speed of such vehicle and the traffic
upon and the conditions of the street."
Mansfield, was decided by the Utah Supreme Court under the

-3-

former provisions of Article VIII, § 9 of the Utah Constitution
which provided:
Appeals shall also lie from the final judgment of
justices of the peace in civil and criminal cases
to District Courts on both questions of law and fact,
with such limitations and restrictions as shall be
provided by law; and the decision of the District
Court on such appeals shall be final, except in cases
involving the validity or constitutionality of a statute.
Thus, under the current provisions of Rule 26(13)(a) of
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, this Court can review all
jurisdictional issues pertaining to appeals from the Logan City
Municipal Justice Court to the First Circuit Court that arise
in the instant case.
DISCUSSION OF POINT 2.
Point 2. The Court overlooked or misapprehended that the
Defendant has been effectively deprived of any and all rights
to appeal his conviction as guaranteed under Article I, § 12
and Article VII/ § 5 of the Utah Constitution and the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
First, the Defendant contends that he was effectively deprived
of any and all rights to appeal his conviction for the offense of
Following another Vehicle Too Closely by the Circuit Court improperly
instructing the jury as to all the elements that constitute the
offense of Following Too Close as defined under Utah Code Ann.
§ 41-6-62, (1953 as amended).
Secondly, the Defendant contends that he was effectively deprived
of any and all rights to appeal his conviction and was subjected
to arbitrary and invidious discrimination by the Circuit Courtfs
failure to instruct the jury "if they believed any witness had
-4-

willfully testified falsely as to any material fact in this
case, they were at liberty to disregard the whole of the
testimony of such witness, except as he may have been corroborated
by credible witnesses or credible evidence.
This is a standard instruction which has been given in all
criminal cases except the instant case since the Utah Supreme
Court ruled on the matter in State v. Morris, 40 Utah 431, 122 P.
380 (1912) •

This instruction does not depend upon any certain

quantum of evidence to be introduced at trial, but does appear to
be mandatory.
The Defendant was deprived of his right to appeal and was
subjected to arbitrary and invidious discrimination because the
Circuit Court's failure to give this instruction which would have
given the jury the discretion to totally reject all of Russell J.
Roper's testimony and found the Defendant not guilty if they
believed he willfully testified falsely as to any material fact
in this case.
Officer Roper f s testimony was not corroborated by any other
witnesses or evidence.

There was no evidence at trial of any

accident which would have corroborated his testimony.
Thirdly, the Defendant has been deprived of his right to
appeal by the Circuit Courtfs failure to rule on the Defendant's
request to be furnished with a transcript of proceedings for the
purpose of this appeal at public expense under the standards set
forth by the United States Supreme Court in Mayer v. City of
Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971).
-5-

The record in this case shows that the Defendant requested
a partial transcript of the proceedings. (R. 20). The
Defendant thereafter filed an Affidavit of Impecuniosity in
the Circuit Court stating that because of his poverty, he was
unable to pay the costs of the partial transcript. (R. 22)

The

Circuit Court did not render any decision as to whether or not
the Defendant would be provided with a transcript for the purpose
of this appeal.

The issue raised by the Defendant on appeal was

that the statute under which the Defendant was convicted was
unconstitutionally vague as applied to the facts of the case.
The State in its Brief states that the Defendant has not provided
the Court of Appeals with a trial transcript.

(Brief of Appellee,

p. 5 ) . However, it has been Logan City who has failed to pay for
and provide the Defendant with a partial transcript to adequately
raise all issues on appeal.
DISCUSSION OF POINT 3,
Point 3. The Court overlooked or misapprehended that the
Defendant's challenge to the trial court's violation of the
separation of power provisions constituted a challenge to the
Circuit Court's subject matter jurisdiction which could be
raised for the first time on appeal.
The Court in Arrinqton v. United States/ 585 A.2d 1342,
1344 (D.C. App. 1991) observed:
The government's contention that only appellant Arrington
has, in Appeal no. 89-637, preserved this issue for appeal,
is meritless. Appellantfs challenge to the validity of the
Act, that the statute had become invalid and ceased to exist,
raises a jurisdictional issue. In the absence of a valid
-6-

statute their prosecutions could not be maintained under
the Act. Challenges to a court's subject matter jurisdiction
cannot be waived.
The Defendant was prosecuted and convicted for a different
offense than charged in the Information and the offense as
instructed to the jury by the Circuit Court was different the
offense as defined under Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-62 and the
violation by the Circuit Court of the separation of powers
provisions constitutes a challenge by the Defendant to the
Circuit Court's subject matter jurisdiction which cannot be
waived and can be raised for the first time on appeal.
CONCLUSION
The Defendant respectfully submits that the issues raised
by the Defendant on appeal should be reconsidered and the
Defendant's conviction should be reversed, or as an alternative,
this matter be restored to the calendar for resubmission.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on this 31st day of October, 1995.

DAVID CRAIG CARLS^tt
CERTIFICATE OF GOOD FAITH
The Defendant certifies that this petition is submitted
in good faith and not for the purpose of delay.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I mailed two true and correct copies of the
foregoing PETITION FOR REHEARING, postage prepaid, to the
following listed below on this 31st day of October, 1995:
Donald G. Linton
Logan City Prosecutor
255 North Main
Logan, Utah 84321
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Marilyn M. Brancn
Clerk of the Court

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo
State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not for Official
Publication)
Case No. 930372-CA

David Craig Carlsen,
Defendant and Appellant.

FILED
(October 5, 1995)

First Circuit, Logan Department
The Honorable Roger S. Dutson
Attorneys:

David Craig Carlsen, Logan, Appellant Pro Se
Donald G. Linton, Logan, for Appellee

Before Judges Onae, Bench, and Wilkins (Law & Motion).
PER CURIAM:
Defendant appeals his conviction for following a police
officer's vehicle too closely in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 41-6-62 (1993).
On appeal, defendant contends the statute is
unconstitutionally vague and violates the separation of powers
provision of the Utah Constitution. The statute is not vague in
all its applications. U.S. v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550 (1975).
Further, the instruction given covered the statutory elements of
the offense. We have reviewed defendant's claims and conclude
that the statute is not unconstitutionally vague. We decline to
reach defendant's claim that the statute violates the separation
of powers provision on the basis that this issue was not raised
in the trial court.
Defendant's conviction is affirmed.

Gregory K

Presiding Judge

Michael J. Wilkins, Judge

IN THE LOGAN CITY MUNICIPAL JUSTICE COURT

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff

)

vs.

]

CARLSEN, David Craig
316 South Main #9
Logan, Utah
3/5/45
Defendant

]

I N F O R M A T I O N

No.

92-6555

]

The STATE OF UTAH, upon evidence and belief, charges the above-named
Defendant with the commission of the following public offense(s):
COUNT 1:
CRIME: FOLLOWING TOO CLOSE
CLASSIFICATION: CLASS C MISDEMEANOR
IN VIOLATION OF: 41-6-62, Utah Code Annotated
AT: Logan, Utah
ON OR ABOUT:
11/7/92
The acts of the Defendant constituting the public offense(s) were:
That the said Defendant, being the driver of a motor vehicle, did then and there
on the streets of Logan City, follow another vehicle more closely than was
reasonable and prudent having due regard for the speed of such vehicle and the
traffic upon the conditions of the street.
This information is based on evidence obtained from the following witnesses:
R. J. ROPER, LCPD
R. J. PETERSON, LCPD

DATED 1/2 - / * ?^~

DAMAGES:

Date Filed:

YES

NO

hO-h Q£L

INSTRUCTION NO.

Before you may convict the Defendant of following too close,

you must

find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the following
elements of that crime, to-wit:
1.

That the Defendant was driving a motor vehicle at the time and
place as alleged in the Information.

2.

That the Defendant was driving in Logan City, Cache County, State
of Utah.

3.

That the distance maintained by the defendant between vehicles

was not reasonable and prudent.
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and all of the
essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, it is your
duty to find the defendant guilty of this offense.

On the other hand, if

the evidence has failed to so establish one or more of the said elements,
then you should find the defendant not guilty of this offense.

DAVID CRAIG CARLSEN
Defendant in Pro Se
P.O. Box 148
Logan, Utah 84323-0148
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF CACHE, LOGAN CITY DEPARTMENT
STATE OF UTAH,
DEFENDANT'S AMENDED REQUEST
Plaintiff,

FOR PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT

-vsDAV1D CRAIG CARLSEN,
Case No. 925003231
Defendant.

TO:

Penny C. Abbott
COMES NOW, the above-named defendant, David Craig

Carlsen, and hereby requests a partial transcript of the
proceedings held in the above-entitled matter in this Court
as follows:
1.

A full transcript of the proceedings held on

defendant's motion to suppress evidence held in this Court
on February 8, 1993.
2.

A partial transcript of the proceedings held at

trial on March 26, 1993 which should include the following:
(a)

The full testimony of Russell J. Roper.

(b)

The full testimony of defendant, David Craig Carlsen,

(c)

Exceptions by the defendant as to jury instructions.

(d)

Defendant's verbal motion in arrest of judgment.
C& se

\vkO

flfi

- ?•'£-

(e)

Conversation between the Court, defendant and

the prosecutor prior to imposition of sentence.
(f)

Imposition of sentence.

DATED this 22nd day of July, 1993.

<*£/4>—^

1)AVID CRAIG CARLSE "'
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that I mailed a true and exact copy of the
foregoing Amended request for partial transcript to Scott L.
Wyatt, Logan City Prosecutor, located at 255 North Main, Logan,
Utah, 84321, postage prepaid and by placing the same in a U.S.
Mailbox on this 22nd day of July, 1993.

^C^a/?M^7 /Zut*4&,
DAVID CRAIG CARLSEN^/

-2-
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LOGAN D ! S T R ! C T
DEC

DAVID CRAIG CARLSEN
Defendant in Pro Se
P.O. Box 148
Logan, Utah 84323-0148

IS 3 s i iJ f33

CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF CACHE, LOGAN CITY DEPARTMENT
STATE OF UTAH,
AFFIDAVIT OF IMPECUNIOSITY
Plaintiff,
-vsDAVID CRAIG CARLSEN,
Case No- 925003231
Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH

)

County of Cache

)

ss.

DAVID CRAIG CARLSEN, being first duly sworn upon oath,
deposes and says:
I have heretofore requested a partial transcript of proceedings
held in the above-entitled matter for the purpose of appeal.

I

have been confined in the Cache County Jail for the past 26 days
without work release and am unable to pay the costs of said transcript.
Because of my poverty the costs of said transcript would make me
destitute and I request an Order to provide the same.

I verily

FILED.

ff<3A

DEC 1 6 1993
BY

/Y\o,G>

believe that I am entitled to the relief I seek on said appeal.

•r^^^z-t^rr

>1<~<X4^

/fY*&

/S&*^>Q

DAVID CRAIG CARLSEI

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me on this 16th day of December, 1993

_

My Commission Expires:

wn*.

.

•, j #

NOTARY PUBLIC

,<T^^v

TTTT,,

,

ALLREP

6 1 0 North Main* P.O. Box 1 7 1
Logan, UT 8 4 3 2 1
My Commission Expirts:
_ _
StataofUtah

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I mailed a true ancl exact copy of the foregoing
Affidavit to the Logan City Prosecutor, located at 255 North Main,
Logan, Utah, 84321, postage prepaid and by placing the same in a
U.S. Mailbox on this 16th day of December, 1993.

y

DAVID CRAIG CARLS

-2-
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When a decree of divorce is made, the
court may make such orders in relation to
the children, property and parties, and
the maintenance of the parties and children, as may be equitable. .
It is to be particularly noted that that language is in general terms and contains no
hint of limitation. The import of our decisions implementing that statute is that proceedings in regard to the family are equitable in a high degree; and that the court
may take into consideration all of the pertinent circumstances. 2 It is our opinion that
the correct view under our law is that this
encompasses all of the assets of every nature possessed by the parties, whenever
obtained and from whatever source derived;
and that this includes any such pension
fund or insurance. These should be given
due consideration along with all other assets, income and the earnings and the potential earning capacity of the parties, in
determining what is the most practical, just
and equitable way to serve the best interests and welfare of the parties and their
children.3
[5] Defendant's other ground of attack
is that the decree requires him to maintain
certain life insurance policies with his children as beneficiaries for a period of 15
years. On this point defendant is correct.
He is not legally obligated to provide any
such support or benefit for his son Robert
who is 25 years of age; and he is obliged to
do so for his daughter Diane only until she
attains the age of 18 years. 4 It is therefore
necessary that the decree be modified accordingly.
Affirmed as modified.
bear their own costs.

The parties to

ELLETT, C. J., and MAUGHAN, WILKINS and HALL, JJ., concur.
2. See Pinion v. Pinion, 92 Utah 255, 67 P.2d
265.
3. Wilson v. Wilson, 5 Utah 2d 79, 296 P.2d 977.
4. U.C.A.1953, Sec. 15-2-1, formerly provided
that the period of minority extended in males
to 21 years and females to 18 years, but in

The STATE of Utah, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.
Thomas Michael MANSFIELD,
Defendant and Respondent
No. 15375.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Feb. 28, 1978.

Defendant appealed from his conviction
in City Court of Brigham City of driving 70
miles per hour. The First District Court,
Box Elder County, VeNoy Christoffersen,
J., permitted State's amendment to complaint and granted defendant's motion to
dismiss, and State appealed. The Supreme
Court, Ellett, C. J., held that: (1) complaint
on appeal from city court could not be
amended in district court, and (2) where
amended complaint filed in district court
was never signed by any complaining witness, dismissal of complaint was mandated.
Affirmed.

1. Criminal Law <s=>260.13
Complaint on appeal from city court
could not be amended in district court;
since district court only had derivative jurisdiction, if complaint was faulty in city
court, it remained faulty on appeal.
2. Indictment and Information <^=*162
Where defendant was convicted in city
court of driving 70 miles per hour in violation of resolution adopted by State Road
Commission, where, on appeal, district court
permitted amendment which charged that
S.L.U.1975, Ch. 39, Sec. 1, it was changed to
make minority extend to 18 years for both
sexes, however it added that courts in divorce
actions may order support to age 21. See also
exception noted in Dehm v. Dehm in footnote 1
above.

STATE v. MANSFIELD

Utah

1277
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defendant dro^e 70 miles per hour in violation of proclamation issued by Governor,
but where amended complaint filed in district court was never signed by any complaining witness, dismissal of complaint was
mandated. U.C.A.1953, 77-57-2, 78-4-16.

a city court cannot be amended in the district court. The district court has only derivative jurisdiction and, therefore, if the
complaint was faulty in the city court, it
remains faulty on appeal. 1

3. Indictment and Information <3=>52(1)
Person can only be tried for misdemeanor on complaint duly signed and sworn
to before magistrate. U.C.A.1953, 77-57-2,
78-4-16.

[2,3] In the second place, the amended
complaint filed in the district court was
never signed by any complaining witness
and a person can only be tried for a misdemeanor on a complaint duly signed and
sworn to before a magistrate. 2

Robert B. Hansen, Atty. Gen., Salt Lake
City, 0. Dee Lund, Box Elder County Atty.,
Jon J. Bunderson, Deputy Box Elder County Atty., Brigham City, for plaintiff and
appellant.

The reason why the state desired to
amend the complaint was because this
Court had held in the case of State v.
Foukas* that the resolution adopted by the
State Road Commission was void and of no
force and effect.

Grant M. Prisbrey, Salt Lake City, for
defendant and respondent.
ELLETT, Chief Justice:
The respondent was charged in the City
Court of Brigham City, Utah, with the
crime of driving 70 miles per hour on the
highways of this state in violation of a
resolution adopted by the State Road Commission. At the trial in the city court he
was convicted and appealed the case to the
district court where the state undertook to
amend the complaint, charging that the respondent drove 70 miles per hour in violation of a proclamation issued by the Governor of Utah. The court permitted the
amendment and respondent filed a Motion
to Dismiss. The court granted the motion
and entered its Judgment of Dismissal on
the ground that as a matter of law, the
proclamation of the Governor had no binding force and effect. The State now appeals from the judgment in favor of respondent.

It is not necessary to consider the point
raised on this appeal, to wit: the constitutionality of the proclamation of the Governor. That matter is dealt with in a companion case decided at this term of Court,
viz: State in the Interest of David Prisbey,
a person under eighteen years of age. 4
Since the district court had no jurisdiction to try the respondent on the amended
complaint, it properly granted respondent's
Motion to Dismiss and that judgment is
hereby affirmed. No costs are awarded.
CROCKETT, MAUGHAN,
and HALL, JJ.r concur.

[1] While the matter is not raised by
either party on this appeal, there are two
reasons why the dismissal must stand. In
the first place, a complaint on appeal from
1. Spangler v. District Court, 104 Utah 584. 140
P.2d 755 (1943).

3. Utah, 560 P.2d 312 (1977).
4. Utah, 576 P.2d 1278 (1978).

2. U.C.A., 1953, 77-57-2, 78-4-16.

WILKINS
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question. Defendant objected to this evidence on the ground that it was not proper
rebuttal, and, further, that the questions propounded to the prosecutrix by the district
attorney on tills point were leading. The objections were overruled. W e think, under
the peculiar facts of this case, this was
error.
[7] The prosecution of this case seems to
have been conducted on the theory that the
defendant was being sued for seduction as
well as being tried for the adultery. When
evidence was introduced on behalf of the
state tending to show that the defendant
had had adulterous intercourse with the
prosecutrix as charged in the information,
the prosecution then proceeded to introduce
evidence to show that she was first defiled
by the defendant. In other words, that he
was responsible for the ruin, downfall, and
shame of a pure and innocent girl. This
evidence did not tend to prove or disprove
any fact material to any issue in the case.
The only question for the jury to determine,
was, Did the defendant, who was admitted
to be a married man, have sexual intercourse
with the prosecutrix at the time and place
alleged in the information? The question
as to whether the prosecutrix was first de-*
filed by the defendant or some other person
was not germane to any issue in the case,
and was therefore wholly immaterial and
should have been excluded. That this evidence had its effect on the jury and was
prejudicial to the defendant hardly admits
of a doubt This we think is shown by the
remarks of the court to the defendant at
the time judgment was pronounced. The
court said: 44This is one of the most serious
cases of the kind that has come before the
court for a long time owing to the youth* of
the girl. From her testimony the jury believed that you were the father of her ruin."
We do not refer to these remarks in a spirit
of criticism, but merely to invite attention
to the importance that the state attached
to this phase of the proceedings, and the
prejudicial effect the evidence In question
must have had on the jury.
There are other errors assigned which are
based on certain rulings of the court, but,
as no exceptions were taken to the rulings
and in some instances no objections made
thereto, we cannot consider them.
The judgment is reversed and the cause
remanded, with directions to the trial court
to grant a new trial.
FRICK, C. J., and STRAUP, J., concur.

(Utah

several shots at his pursuers, and when caught
by the deceased turned and shot him, evidence
of the robbery, flight, and pursuit were admissible as illustrating and characterizing the act
of the defendant in a prosecution for the homicide.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Homicide.
Cent. Dig. §§ 341-350; D e c Dig. § 169.*]
2. HOMICIDE (§ 161*)—EVIDENCE—RES GEST.K
—PURPOSE OF ADMISSION.

Such testimony was admissible not only
to evidence the intent, but also to show the
motive of the shooting.
[Ed. 'Note.—For other cases, see Homicide.
Cent. Dig. § 302; Dec. Dig. § 161.*]
3. HOMICIDE (§ 308*)—TRIAL—INSTRUCTIONS
—LANGUAGE OF STATUTE.

Where a court in its charge defined first
degree murder, in the language of the statute
(Comp. Laws 1907, § 4161), as murder perpetrated in one of several ways, though the allegation of the information alleged and the
state's proof tended to prove that the defendant willfully, maliciously, etc., shot and killed
the deceased, the instruction was' proper, as
the different kinds of first degree murder enumerated were so connectedly set forth as to
render it difficult to state one in the language
of the statute without stating the others.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Homicide,
Cent. Dig. §§ 642-647; D e c Dig. § 308.*]
4. CRIMINAL L A W (§ S23*>— TRIAL— INSTRUCTIONS—CHARGE AS A WHOLE.

A charge as to murder in the first degree
in the language of the statute was not erroneous, where the court also told the jury that the
defendant could not be convicted for the commission of all or any of the "unlawful acts immediately prior or subsequent to the killing**
of the deceased; that, "in this case, the state
does not rely for a conviction on the theory
that the homicide charged in the information
was committed in the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate a burglary or robbery";
that a finding of the previous commission of a
robbery or burglary would not change the degree of murder or manslaughter; and also
charged a conviction only on the ground that*
the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that
the killing was unlawful, willful, deliberate, and
premeditated with malice or forethought, and
with a specific intent to take the life of the deceased, clearly defining the terms used.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Criminal
Law, Cent Dig. §§ 1992-1995, 3158; D e c Di«.
§ 823.']
5. CRIMINAL L A W (§ 757*)—TRIAL— INSTRUCTIONS—CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES—PROVINCE OF JUBT—"LlBEBTY."

An instruction that the jury, if they believed "any witness had willfully testified falsely
as to any material fact in the case," were "at
liberty to disregard the whole of the testimony
of such witness, except as he may have been
corroborated by credible witnesses or credible
evidence," was not improper as requiring the
jury to reject or accept, any portion of the testimony of such a witness, as the word "liberty," as used in the charge, implies freedom and
choice.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Criminal
Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1772-1785; D e c Dig. |
757.*]
6. CBIMINAL L A W (§ 757*)—TBIAL—INSTRUCTIONS—CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES.

The instruction on the credibility of witnesses was not improper as implying that, if a
witness were corroborated, the jury could not
1. HOMICIDE (5 169*)— EVIDENCE—RES G E S - reject all or a part of his testimony, where in
other portions of the charge the court expressTAE.
Where a person, after holding ap a pawn- ly told the jury that they were the "sole judges
shop, was pursued by several persons, fired of the weight of the evidence, the credibility
STATE v. MORRIS.
(Supreme Court of Utah. March 8, 1912.)
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MAYER v. CITY OF CHICAGO
APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS

No. 70-5040. Argued October 14,. 1971—
Decided December 13, 1971
Appellant was convicted on nonfelony charges of violating two
city of Chicago ordinances and was sentenced to pay a fine of
$250 on each offense. Desiring to appeal, he petitioned the trial
court for a free trial transcript to support his appeal on the
grounds of insufficient evidence and prosecutorial misconduct.
Although the court found that he was indigent, it denied his
application on the basis of an Illinois Supreme Court rule which
provided for trial transcripts only in felony cases. Other rules
provided alternatives to a transcript in the form of a "Settled
Statement" or an "Agreed Statement of Facts." Without resorting to either alternative, appellant moved for a free transcript
in the State Supreme Court. The motion was denied. Held:
1. Although the State must afford the indigent defendant a
trial " 'record of sufficient completeness7 to permit proper consideration of [his] claims/' Draper v. Washington, 372 U. S. 487, 499,
it need not necessarily furnish a complete verbatim transcript, but
may provide alternatives that accord effective appellate review.
Pp. 193-195.
2. When the defendant's grounds for appeal, as here, make
out a colorable need for a complete transcript, the State has
the burden of showing that only a portion thereof or an "alternative" will suffice for an effective appeal on those grounds. P. 195.
3. The distinction drawn by the State Supreme Court rule between felony and nonfelony offenses is an "unreasoned distinction"
proscribed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 195-196.
4. The fact that the charges on which the appellant was convicted were punishable by a fine rather than by confinement does
not lessen the invidious discrimination against an indigent defendant. Pp. 196-198.
Vacated and remanded.
BREXNAN, J., delivered the opinion for
BURGER, C. J., post, p. 199, and BLACKMUN,

concurring opinions.

a unanimous Court.
J., post, p. 201, filed

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Art. VIII, § 5

Sec. 5. [Jurisdiction of district court and other courts —
Right of appeal.]
The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters except as
limited by this constitution or by statute, and power to issue all extraordinary
writs. The district court shall have appellate jurisdiction as provided by statute. The jurisdiction of all other courts, both original and appellate, shall be
provided by statute. Except for matters filed originally with the Supreme
Court, there shall be in all cases an appeal of right from the court of original
jurisdiction to a court with appellate jurisdiction over the cause.
History: Const. 1896; L. 1943, S.J.R. 2;
1984 (2nd S.S.), S.J.R. 1.
Compiler's Notes. — Provisions similar to
,hose in this section were formerly found in
Vrt. VIII, Sees. 7, 8 and 9.

Cross-References. — Original and appellate jurisdiction, § 78-3-4.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

ii general.
ippeal by the state in criminal cases.
.ppeal where case originated in circuit court.
.ppeals.
ity court supervision.
defendant's right to appeal.
istrict court jurisdiction.
-Appellate.
-Original.
ivorce decree.
quity as distinguished from law case.
xtraordinary writs.
nal judgment.
abeas corpus.
voking jurisdiction.
ivenile court supervision.
igislative enlargement or abridgement of
powers.
jview in cases at law.
tview of evidence in equity cases.
ght to appeal.
jrtmary appellate disposition.
mporary restraining orders.
ted.
general.
Although district courts of this state are
irts of original jurisdiction, having jurisdicn in all matters both civil and criminal
ich are not excepted by law or the Constitute one district court has no power to exercise
itrol over another. Nielson v. Schiller, 92
ih 137, 66 P.2d 365 (1937).
peal by the state in criminal cases.
*his section does not grant the state a gen1 right of appeal in criminal cases. State v.
bach, 569 P.2d 1100 (Utah 1977).

Appeal where c a s e o r i g i n a t e d in circuit
court
Supreme Court had jurisdiction to entertain
appeals from district court decisions where the
case originated in a circuit court and involved
a constitutional issue; Supreme Court's jurisdiction was not limited, as is its jurisdiction
over appeals from a district court decision
where the case originated in a justice court, to
cases involving the constitutionality or validity of a statute. State v. Taylor, 664 P.2d 439
(Utah 1983).
Appeals.
The district courts of this state had appellate
jurisdiction insofar as entertaining appeals of
decisions rendered by board of registration of
trades and professions revoking license of physicians. Baker v. Department of Registration,
78 Utah 424, 3 P.2d 1082 (1931).
District judge who was called to another district to try a case did not have jurisdiction to
settle bill of exceptions in his home district.
Jenkins v. Forsey, 83 Utah 527, 30 P.2d 220
(1934).
Right to appeal is valuable and constitutional right and should not be denied except
where it is clear that right has been lost or
abandoned. Adamson v. Brockbank, 112 Utah
52, 185 P.2d 264 (1947).
City court supervision.
District court had subject matter jurisdiction
over misdemeanor assault and battery prosecution; jurisdiction over the person was conferred
by accused's stipulation that case might be
transferred from city court to district court and
his appearance in latter court; fact that prosecution was initiated by complaint rather than
indictment or information did not preclude district court jurisdiction. Jardine v. Harris, 63
Utah 560. 227 P. 1029 (1924).
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32 diamonds, and some watches. They then
left the shop and ran south on Commercial
street to Orpheum alley, then to State street,
and then south to Second South street.
There the defendant ran west on Second
South street to Commercial street and then
diagonally across Second South street to the
sidewalk, where the deceased was killed,
about a block from the place of the robbery.
When they left the pawnshop, they were
pursued by one or more persons from the
shop calling: "Police! Robbers! Stop them!"
At or near State street and Orpheum alley,
the defendant shot at or in the direction of
one of the persons so pursumg him, and
then ran down the street with a gun in his
hand, and calling to those in pursuit to:
"Stop! Stay back!" A number of persons,
20 or more, joined in the chase, calling out:
"There is the other! Stop him! Catch him!"
The deceased, who was on the platform of a
street car on Second South street near the
place of the homicide, stated as he left the
car, 'Til get him," and ran to the sidewalk.
There he seized the defendant by the arm or
shoulder. The defendant turned and said to
him, "Stop! You son of a bitch!" shoved
him back* with one hand, and with the other
shot and instantly killed him. Another immediately seized the defendant by the coat.
The defendant shot and wounded him, and
then ran a few rods farther, when he was
seized by a deputy sheriff. He also shot at
the deputy; the bullet passing through the
deputy's clothes. There he was overpowered
by the deputy and arrested- The defendant
testified that in his attempt to release himself from the deceased's grasp his gun was
accidentally discharged, and that he remembered nothing more until after his arrest and
on his way to the police station.

lence, in a prosecution for homicide,
Sustain a conviction for murder in the
^ee.
[1] The defendant complains of the ruling
bte.—For other cases, see Homicide,
fg.'§§ 523-532; Dec. Dig. § 253.*]
admitting the evidence of the robbery, the
jf* from District Court, Salt Lake defendant's flight, and his pursuit. It is
contended these things constituted parts of
f. Frederick Loofbourow, Judge.
^Morris was convicted of murder in a transaction separate and distinct from that
on trial. We think not. They were parts of
^ d e g r e e , and appeals. Affirmed.
one continuous transaction, and were conBadger and D. Alexander, for appel- nected with and were a part of the main
. R. Barnes, Atty. Gen., for the State.
fact under investigation, and tended to illusThey characterCOP, J. The defendant was charged trate and characterize i t
nd convicted of, first degree murder, ized and explained the act of the deceased
| a s sentenced to suffer death. He ap- seizing the defendant, and the object, purg ~ The questions presented for review pose, motive, and intent of the shooting.
O o admission of testimony and to the The robbery, the flight, the pursuit, the seizure, the shooting, v/e.Y£ as nearly eonterape evidence on the part of the state poraneous as things could well be. The
" ^ t h a t the defendant and another, be- deceased's seizing the defendant and the
t> and 6 o'clock on the afternoon of defendant's shooting him were prompted and
§9* 1911, at Salt Lake City, entered a induced under the immediate influences of
[shop on First South street near Com- the robbery, the flight, and the pursuit They
gij street, and, with loaded guns, com- were the product, the outgrowth, of the imand compelled the persons in the mediate and present influences of the rob"hold up their hands." Such other bery, the flight, and pursuit The seizure
hem covered with his gun while the and the shooting, of course t could have been
jlant took from the shop or store $72, shown without proof of the preceding cir' cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Die & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Hep'r Indexes
x
State r. Thorne, 117 Pac. W.
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terlrtfigiven the testimony of the de- diagonally across Second South street to the
sidewalk, where the deceased was killed,
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pursued by one or more persons from the
*** Ww
(§ 1172*)— APPEAL AND
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Ving of an instruction on the credi- At or near State street and Orpheum alley,
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the only witness in his own be- one of the persons so pursuing him, and
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^whether the shooting was intention- then ran down the street with a gun in his
cfdental, as the verdict of the jury hand, and calling to those in pursuit to:
tjiiave been reached under a belief "Stop! Stay back!" A number of persons,
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fate—For other cases, see Criminal "There is the other! Stop him! Catch him!"
fifc'rDig. §§ 3128. 3154-3157, 315&-3163, The deceased, who was on the platform of a
.-Dig. § 1172.*]
street car on Second South street naar the
cn>B ( | 354*)—IMPOSITION OF P E N A L - place of the homicide, stated as he left the
. RETION OF JURY.
car, "I'll get him," and ran to the sidewalk.
jfer^the statute which gives a jury ren- There he seized the defendant by the arm or
Jgrerdict of first degree murder discre|£na&e a recommendation that the de- shoulder. The defendant turned and said to
cimprisoned for life and vesting in him, "Stop! You son of a bitch!" shoved
^$e xight to use its discretion in act- him back* with one hand, and with the other
on^with no alternative but to impose j
Drpfenalty, where no recommendation jI shot and instantly killed him. Another im-.
. afefiere the court, in a prosecntion for 1 mediately seized the defendant by the coat.
&d&) advised the jury that the making The defendant shot and wounded him, and
folding of the recommendation was en- then ran a few rods farther, when he was
tfri. their discretion, and gave them
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Mellifluence in reaching a conclusion, the deputy; the bullet passing through the
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ftuxder in the first degree without a recby the deputy and arrested- The defendant
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. t 731; Dec. Dig, 5 354.*]
accidentally discharged, and that he remem$*$DK ($ 253*)—EVIDENCE.
"dence, in a prosecution for homicide, bered nothing more until after his arrest and
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[1] The defendant complains of the ruling
?6te.—For other cases, see Homicide,
)ig/§§ 523-532; Dec. Dig. § 253.*]
admitting the evidence of the robbery, the
a]r from District Court, Salt Lake defendant's flight, and his pursuit. It is
contended these things constituted parts of
Ki'rFrederick Loofbourow, Judge.
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on trial. We think not. They were parts of
it degree, and appeals. Affirmed.
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that this is why the law requires a hearing
in this case. See Ramsey v. United States,
569 A.2d 142 (D.C.1990), cited by the majority.) The mandate of § 23-110 is clear:
"[u]nless the motion and files and records
of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall
cause notice thereof to be served upon the
prosecuting authority, grant a prompt
hearing thereon, determine the issues, and
make findings of fact and conclusions of
law with respect thereto." D.C.Code
§ 23-110 (1989 Repl.).
The problem with the majority's reasoning is that it has put the cart before the
horse. In finding that the outcome of the
case would have been no different under
the prejudice prong of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 66S, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80
L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), it is carving out any
exception to the mandate of § 23-110. It
has stopped short of holding that the spedfications of the motion are "patently frivolous" or "palpably incredible." It could
not so hold on the face of the record because, with respect to those specifications,
there is no record. We have repeatedly
emphasized that, when a post-trial motion
alleges ineffective assistance of counsel, a
hearing is required, "where the ineffectiveness concerns facts dehors the record."
See Shepard v. United States, 533 A.2d
1278, 1283 (D.C.1987), citing Gibson, supra, 388 A.2d at 1216; see also Miller v.
United States, 479 A.2d 862, 869-70 (D.C.
1984). Only recently we re-emphasized the
importance of developing a pertinent factual record where an appellant has raised a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
See Simpson v. United States, 576 A.2d
1336, 1338-39 (D.C.1990); see Johnson v.
United States, 585 A.2d 766 (D.C.1991).
I would remand the record for a hearing
and appropriate findings.
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Defendants were convicted in the Superior Court, Joseph M. Hannon, Robert M.
Scott, George Herbert Goodrich and Henry
H. Kennedy. Jr., JJ., of drug offenses, and
they appealed. The Court of Appeals, Rogers, C.J., held that District of Columbia
Controlled Substances Act was not invalidated by mayor's failure to republish
schedules of controlled substances.
Affirmed.
1. Criminal Law <S=>105
Challenge to validity of statute under
which defendant was convicted constituted
challenge to court's subject matter jurisdiction which could not be waived.
2. Statutes «^188
Reliance on plain language of statute
may not suffice when to do so would produce result which is contrary to intent of
legislature.
3. Statutes <£=>227
Meaning of the word "shall" in a statute is not always mandatory command, but
may be directory.
4. Drugs and Narcotics <s=343
District of Columbia Controlled Substances Act was not invalidated by mayor's
failure to republish schedules of controlled
substances; intent of council of the District
of Columbia was to require republication
only when revisions were made to schedules. D.C.Code 1981, § 33-523.

